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Kloker v. Fort Peck Tribes, 2018 WL 7324879 (Fort Peck C.A. Oct.
12, 2018)
Hallee C. Kansman
Kloker v. Fort Peck Tribes investigates and deciphers the
application of the Indian canons of construction to the congressional
formation and establishment of the Fort Peck reservation in Montana. In
general, courts interpret congressional acts creating reservations through
the lens of the tribal-federal government trust relationship. Although this
case examines different substantive models of legal interpretation and
theories of water law, the ultimate dispute is textual in nature—
questioning the plain language of the establishment legislation itself.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, a non-Indian man—Marc Kloker (“Kloker”)—violated a
Comprehensive Code of Justice (“CCOJ”) provision when hunting within
the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Reservation (“Reservation”)
without a tribal permit.1 He allegedly hunted on fee lands owned by a nonIndian.2 Kloker’s main argument against his guilt stemmed from the
physical changes in the waterway originally used to define the reservation
boundary according to the Congressional Act of May 1, 1888
(“Congressional Act”).3 The primary purpose of the Congressional Act
was to establish a permanently fixed boundary for the Assiniboine and
Sioux tribes (“Tribes”) by identifying a specific territorial jurisdiction.4
Upon reviewing both briefs and the lower court’s actions, the Fort Peck
Appellate Court (“Appellate Court”) determined oral arguments were not
required to decide the issues.5 Additionally, the Appellate Court found the
Fixed Boundary Theory was the appropriate way to delineate the exterior
boundaries of the Reservation; therefore, accretion and avulsion events
should not change the designated boundaries.6 The Appellate Court
remanded the case to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing.7
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.
Kloker v. Fort Peck Tribes, 2018 WL 7324879 (Fort Peck C.A. Oct.
12, 2018).
2.
Id. at ¶ 6.
3.
Id. at ¶ 1; see Congressional Act of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113, 116.
4.
Id. at ¶ 20.
5.
Id. at ¶ 2.
6.
Id. at ¶ 25. Accretion and avulsion are concepts used in water law to
determine property boundary lines where changes in a stream’s course occur.
Accretion is the process of growth or increase of land area, typically, by the gradual
accumulation of additional layers or matter. Avulsion occurs by an abrupt change in a
channel in which the stream suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one. See
David H. Getches et al., Water Law in a Nutshell 58-60 (5th ed. 2015).
7.
Id. at ¶ 25.
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On May 1, 1888, Congress established the exterior boundaries of
the Reservation.8 The legislation stated:
the Missouri River acts as the Reservation’s southern
boundary in the middle of the main channel thereof
between the mouths of Big Muddy Creek in the east and
the Milk River in the west. The western boundary of the
reservation then proceeds north thence up the middle of
the main channel of Milk River to Porcupine Creek before
bearing to a point forty miles due north in a direct line
from the middle of the main channel of the Missouri River
opposite the mouth of the Milk River. The boundary then
heads due east to form the northern boundary until
reaching the middle of Big Muddy Creek, thereby turning
south along the middle of that waterway to form the
eastern boundary until its nexus with the middle of the
Missouri River.9
The coordinates 48º 3’ 2” N, 106º 17’ 22” W marked the point on
which a Fort Peck Fish and Wildlife Department Warden (“Warden”)
found Kloker and another non-Indian hunter—without a Fort Peck Tribal
Permit to hunt—on October 4, 2016.10 This point was just west of the
historic Milk River channel, approximately one mile east of the current
Milk River channel, a short distance north of the Missouri River, and
located on fee lands owned by a non-Indian.11 The Warden determined
Kloker’s location was well within the Reservation boundary, which he
considered to be the current intersection of the Milk River and the
Missouri River.12 The Warden cited Kloker for hunting without a tribal
license.13
In 2017, Kloker appealed the Fort Peck Tribal Court Order finding
him in violation of 19 CCOJ § 201, hunting without a tribal permit within
the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Reservation.14 The court exercised
its jurisdiction over issues regarding non-Indians on tribal land and found
in favor of the Tribe.15 Kloker received a $500 fine and the court retained
his shotgun as collateral.16 The Tribes maintained that the language of the
Congressional Act was unambiguous and the western boundary was in the
middle of the Milk River, wherever it presently lies.17 In his appeal, Kloker
appeared pro se in front of the Appellate Court and told the court he
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. (citing 19 CCOJ § 201)
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. (citing 19 CCOJ § 201).
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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believed he was hunting outside the Reservation’s boundaries.18
Additionally, Kloker argued the current location of the intersection of the
middle of the Missouri and Milk Rivers is not the same point described in
the Congressional Act; instead, the point moved one mile west after an
avulsion event changed the bed of the river.19 The Appellate Court
accepted Kloker’s appeal and issued a stay.20
III. ANALYSIS
A. Congress Established the Mid-Point of the Milk River as the Western
Boundary for the Reservation
The Appellate Court analyzed the issue by applying the canons of
construction.21 The United States Supreme Court employs the canons to
create “enlarged rules of construction, which ensure that the language used
in treaties and statutes with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice.”22 The canons of construction and recognized theories
associated with riparian boundaries aid in resolving disputes between
sovereigns.23 In the landmark Indian law case, Worcester v. Georgia, Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, “[i]f words be made use of which are susceptible
of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the
tenor of the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter
sense.”24 The Indian canons are “rooted in the unique trust relationship
between the United State and the Indians.”25
The Appellate Court pointed to three principles to determine the
legal meaning of the language used in federal documents involving
Indians: (1) language must be construed as the Indians would have
understood it; (2) Indian treaties and statutes must be construed liberally
in favor of the Indians; and (3) ambiguities in the language being
considered must be resolved in favor of the Indians.26 The Appellate Court
referred to Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which provides,
“the canons have quasi-constitutional status and provide an interpretive
methodology for protecting fundamental constitutive, structural values
against all but explicit congressional derogation.”27 Thus, according to the
Appellate Court’s interpretation of the canons of construction, “Congress
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)).
Id. at ¶ 12; see Worcester, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582).
Id. (quoting Oneida Cty. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 257

(1985)).
26.
Id. at ¶ 14 (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)).
27.
Id.; see FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW §2.02[2], 118-119 (Nell Jessop Newton, ed., 2012).
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clearly, unambiguously, and expressly established the mid-point of the
Milk River as the western boundary for the Fort Peck Reservation.”28
B. A Shifting Boundary Was Not Necessarily Envisioned in the
Congressional Act
The Appellate Court considered two possible theories of boundary
determination: (1) the Thalweg Theory; and (2) the Fixed Boundary
Theory.29 The Thalweg Theory pertains to shifting boundary lines due to
the extremely alterable properties of any riparian boundary.30 When
navigable rivers create a boundary between two states, the boundary is the
middle of the main channel used for navigation.31 The thalweg is the
deepest channel of the river, and land formed by accretion belongs to the
upland owner.32 Thus, when a river forms a boundary due to changes by
gradual erosion from one bank and accretion to the other, that boundary
moves with the thalweg.33
However, an exception to the Thalweg Theory and accretion rule
is in the event of avulsion.34 During an avulsive action—a sudden change
in the channel—the state boundary line remains fixed with the mid-point
of the original channel.35 Even in an avulsive event “such a change of
channel works as no change of boundary.”36
The second theory of river boundaries considered by the Appellate
Court is known as the Fixed Boundary Theory and details that river
boundaries remain fixed according to their historical date due to important
historical factors.37 This theory heavily relies on a deeply-rooted historical
analysis of enabling acts and chain of title.38 Thus, accretion and avulsion
events are not determinative.39 It seems doubtful that Congress or the tribes
anticipated a shifting boundary upon ratification of the Congressional
Act.40 The plain reading of article VIII of the Congressional Act states,
“the outboundaries of the separate reservations, or such portions thereof
as are not defined by natural objects shall be surveyed and marked in a
plain and substantial manner.”41 The Congressional Act’s specific
boundary detail fixed a singular point—the northwest corner, at 40 miles
28.
Id. at ¶ 15.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at ¶ 16 (A thalweg is the middle of the primary navigable channel
of a waterway that defines the boundary line between sovereigns).
31.
Id. (citing Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 (1893)).
32.
Id. (citing Arkansas v. Tennessee, 397 U.S. 88 (1970)).
33.
Id. at ¶ 17.
34.
Id. at ¶ 18.
35.
Id.
36.
Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892)).
37.
Id. at ¶ 19.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at ¶ 20.
41.
Id. (quoting Congressional Act of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113, 115)
(emphasis added).
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due north from the mouth of the Milk River—of which all other boundary
corners could be located and determined by natural objects.42 Thus, the
Appellate Court reasoned the mouth of the Milk River was the single most
important aspect in determining not only the precise southwestern corner
of the Reservation, but also the entire western boundary.43
The Appellate Court found the Fixed Boundary Theory was most
applicable when dealing with the exterior boundaries of the Reservation.44
Due to the permanent fixation of the northwest corner, the southwest
corner could no longer be defined by a natural object because it too was
necessarily fixed in relation to the northwest corner.45 The Appellate Court
concluded it is likely the Milk River had not flowed exactly in the same
manner or in the same location since passage of the Congressional Act and
likely will not remain fixed.46 Chief Judge Maylinn Smith stated “a court
must apply evidence describing the exact location of the middle of the
Milk River channel in 1888 using dependable survey records and other
such material.”47
IV. CONCLUSION
Kloker v. Fort Peck Tribes explores the canons of construction
associated with the establishment of the exterior edges of the Reservation
and the notions of current water law theories relating to river boundaries.
Although natural events, such as those connected with avulsion,
commonly occur, they are not seminal to the exterior boundaries of the
Reservation. The relationship between the United States and Indian
nations, and more specifically between the State of Montana and Indian
nations, has continuously remained a point of contention, especially when
a tribe appropriately exercises its rights and jurisdictional authority as a
sovereign nation. The determination of reservation boundaries using
waterways is quite difficult when left without a natural, fixed point;
however, in applying the plain text from establishment documents, a tribe
can establish the breadth of its reaches.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at ¶ 21.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶ 22.
Id. at ¶ 23.
Id.

